Executive Summary
Nigeria’s persistent insecurity has reignited debate over the establishment of State Police. While the 1999 Constitution currently prohibits any police force other than the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), operational realities reveal a deep mismatch between centralized police control and localized security needs. This paper (summary of a recent presentation) examines the constitutional framework, practical challenges of federal policing, comparative international experience, and the critical conditions required for a sustainable and accountable State Police system.
1. Constitutional and Legal Framework
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria establishes a single, federal police force.
a) Section 214(1) provides that there shall be one police force for Nigeria, the Nigeria Police Force, and that “no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.”
b) Sections 215-216 vest operational command in the Inspector‑General of Police (IGP), appointed by the President, with Commissioners of Police (CPs) in the states subordinate to the IGP.
c) Section 4(2), read together with Part I of the Second Schedule (Exclusive Legislative List), places policing, internal security, arms and ammunition squarely under federal control.
The legal position is therefore unambiguous: State Police is unconstitutional under the current framework. Any move toward State Police necessarily requires constitutional amendment.
2. The Centralisation Problem
Although policing is inherently local, the Nigerian police structure is highly centralised. Operational command, postings, promotions, and discipline ultimately flow from Abuja. While CPs are stationed in the states, they remain primarily accountable to the IGP rather than to State Governors.
This creates a structural contradiction: security threats are local, but command authority is distant.
3. State Governors as “Chief Security Officers” – A Legal Fiction
State Governors are commonly described as Chief Security Officers of their states. However, this title has no express constitutional foundation.
In practice, governors:
a) Do not command the police,
b) Do not control the Department of State Services (DSS), the armed forces, or other federal security agencies,
c) Cannot declare a state of emergency (Section 305 reserves this power exclusively for the President).
As a result, governors bear political responsibility for security failures without the legal authority to control the principal security instruments. This imbalance has significantly weakened state‑level security coordination and accountability.
4. Evidence from the States
Senior public officials and scholars have repeatedly highlighted these constraints.
a) In July 2025, the Governor of Zamfara State publicly stated that he could not take full responsibility for security outcomes because the Commissioner of Police must first take instructions from Abuja. “I can’t take full responsibility of the security situation in this state, because I don’t have the command and control of these people. I rely on what the federal government says. And whatever they say is final.” “It’s the same thing with the army; it’s the same thing with Civil Defence. So, it’s a general thing all over the country,” he said.
b) In April 2025, Professor Leonard Karshima Shilgba noted that Benue State’s Anti‑Open Grazing Law (2017) has suffered weak enforcement largely due to the absence of a state‑controlled security force.
These examples illustrate a recurring theme: policy intent at state level is routinely frustrated by federal control of enforcement capacity.
5. The Rise of State Security Outfits
In response to insecurity, many states have created or formalised local security outfits, including:
a) Amotekun Corps (South‑West States),
b) Anambra Vigilante Group (AVG),
c) Zamfara Community Protection Guards (CPG).
While established by state legislation, these bodies are not State Police. They lack:
a) Full police powers,
b) Authority to bear arms,
c) Nationwide or inter‑state jurisdiction.
Their legal status remains fragile, as demonstrated by the Federal High Court’s disbandment of Ebubeagu Security Network in 2023, following allegations of abuse and overreach.
Nevertheless, their emergence underscores a widely acknowledged reality: the federal police alone and/or its current structure and manner of operating is insufficient to meet Nigeria’s security demands.
6. Police Population Ratios: Context, Not Dogma
There is no official United Nations‑mandated police‑to‑population ratio. While a 2022 UN report on Haiti referenced a benchmark of approximately 222 officers per 100,000 people, this was contextual, not prescriptive.
International experience shows wide variation:
a) Many countries operate within a range of 150-300 officers per 100,000 population.
b) England and Wales reported one officer per 408 people in 2023.
c) The United States, despite high aggregate numbers (reported to be about 730,000), faces acute local shortages due to uneven distribution.
The lesson is clear: numbers alone do not guarantee security. Strategy, deployment, accountability, and intelligence‑led policing matter more than raw headcount.
7. Nigeria’s Real Policing Deficit: Deployment and Governance
Nigeria is estimated to have approximately 375,000 police officers for a population often cited at over 220 million, though both figures remain contested due to data gaps.
More critically, senior police officers have acknowledged systemic inefficiencies. One recently retired Assistant Inspector‑General reported that, on assuming duty in multiple states, up to 70% of police personnel were not engaged in core policing duties, with thousands effectively unaccounted for; he could not account for 3000 armed officers.
For example, police officers are routinely used: to guard private residences, as escorts to private citizens and public officers; multiple police officers are often seen escorting children to school; multiple officers are used as personal bodyguards to leaders of faith organisations and religious leaders; many are often sent on errands to shops and markets by private citizens. There is a widespread practice of police getting involved and arresting individuals for purely civil matters, taking resources away from core police duties. For instance, in Abuja during November and December 2025, the police and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps ran an operation with the Bwari Area Council wherein the police arrested and detained (effectively abducting) the security guards of properties that were in default of a controversial and contested radio and television licence fee.
This suggests that Nigeria’s policing crisis is as much about misallocation, capture, and misuse of personnel as it is about numbers. Hence, the call to increase the number of police officers could be misguided.
8. Is State Police the Answer?
Public clamour for State Police is understandable, but it risks being misdirected if treated as a silver bullet. Without deep reform, State Police could simply replicate existing failures at a sub‑national level.
Encouragingly, as of 2024-2025, there is serious momentum within the Federal Government and National Assembly toward constitutional amendment. Existing state security outfits are widely viewed as precursors to formal State Police.
9. Critical Preconditions for Sustainable State Police
If State Police is to succeed, several foundations are non‑negotiable:
Constitutional and Legislative Reform
a) Amendment of Sections 214-216 and 305 of the Constitution.
b) Clear delineation of federal and state policing powers.
Jurisdiction and Cooperation
a) Rules governing inter‑state arrests and transfers, jurisdictional powers.
b) Cost‑sharing mechanisms for cross‑border investigations.
c) Mandatory cooperation frameworks between State Police, the NPF, and federal agencies.
Governance and Oversight
a) Robust safeguards against political capture and abuse.
b) Independent complaints and oversight mechanisms.
c) Strong human rights, community policing, and accountability standards.
Capacity Building
a) Training in strategic deployment and intelligence‑led policing.
b) Clear prohibition of non‑policing duties and private capture of officers.
c) Professional ethics, courage, and impartial enforcement of the law.
10. Conclusion
Constitutional amendment is necessary but not sufficient. The real challenge is cultural and institutional: how Nigeria deploys, governs, and holds its security forces accountable.
State Police, if poorly designed, could deepen insecurity. If carefully structured, professionally trained, and rigorously overseen, it could restore local ownership of security and rebuild public trust.
The question, therefore, is not merely whether Nigeria should have State Police, but whether Nigeria is prepared and willing to do (policing and) State Police properly.
Anthony Oluborode is a lawyer with extensive experience in criminal justice reform, capacity building, and security sector governance. He is a former Special Adviser on Legal Matters to the National Security Adviser and currently leads a legal and national security consultancy consortium.